Data Science can’t crack the Stock Market

Data science is eating jobs, so why can’t algos (e.g. RenTech) “consistently” beat returns the same way as programs can beat high ELO rated players at chess?

The markets are more poker than chess, like life itself – where luck plays a defining role. Algos can break down factor-based investing and even use retail sentiment indicators (such as ICICI Direct’s RIBI) to make bets.

A data scientist will break LUCK as “stacked probabilities” in strategies backed by back-testing. This lies at the heart of algorithmic trading.

Let’s take the Put Call Ratio or PCR. PCR over 1 is seen as a bearish indicator but also as a contrarian indicator. Can an algorithm bake in “contrarianism”?

What happens to valuation defying momentum returns in the grip of panic like the crash in FAANG stocks?

What about Trump’s ever changing stance on trade wars?

Business is war. War by nature is asymmetric and unpredictable. In 1942, Germany’s surrender was thought to be around the corner due to its failure to secure Russian oil fields. Germany ground on till 1945, partly due to innovations in equipment and in using synthetic fuel (Fischer-Tropsch process).

Companies similarly are an ever-changing, non-ergodic process, with new inventions, new information and predicting their moves can be like predicting the weather on mars.

So you can take the emotion out of the markets but can you ever take the market out of emotions?

Nevertheless, those who sell shovels for this new gold rush to extract Alpha out of Data will get incredibly rich in the process.

Q3 Results by Avenue Supermarts. End of the uptrend?

Poor Avenue Supermarts (DMart) Q3 numbers.

In two months, stock was up from 1150 to 1650 in anticipation of good results and other news related euphoria like the new e-commerce policy that restricts foreign e-tailers. But now with just 2% PAT growth valuations seem unreasonable. I previously wrote how the stock was overpriced at IPO.

Even the salvaging 33% growth in topline is not sustainable. Discount stores can’t keep mushrooming at historical rates and same-store sales cannot grow indefinitely by giving deep discounts and squeezing suppliers.

So if not for growth or earnings, what are shareholders paying a forward PE of 78 for? Peter Lynch said he judges retailers by same-store growth and inventory turns.

Share holders should keep an eye out for trouble in DMart – especially piling of inventories and rising working capital that may signal that growing sales by discounting is not working well enough to catch up with valuations.

On Charts:

Stock has broken below 20-day SMA, center line of the Bollinger Band, which suggests the short term uptrend since November may be coming to an end. It will break under RSI center line on Monday, 14-January, beginning a down trend.

Is the IL&FS debt default truly a Lehman moment for Indian markets? What investors must know

There is panic in equity investor circles with regards to what’s cooking in the opaque and mysterious debt markets.

In part, the panic is justified because a crash in financials stocks is seen as a leading indicator of an imminent and broader stock market crash.

Debt investors are known to be more conservative than equity market participants and a debt market freeze is often indicative of a shock across stock markets and the economy.

Stocks of Indian public banks and NBFCs have corrected sharply, partly due to fear and in part also from changing fundamentals from rising cost of borrowings. Bond yields have gone up and are expected to keep going up given the end of central bank quantitative easing, and the uptick in costs of funding globally. Money is getting expensive.

Fears of an Economic Crisis

Closer home, there is a much larger and looming fear than a stock market crash. A fear that the stress which was previously on the asset side of the balance sheet (non-performing loans) of financials has now spread to the liability side of the balance sheet (funding and liquidity for NBFCs).

Crippling of NBFCs will be akin to choking off the oxygen supply of the wider economy.

Regulatory actions and restructuring of the bad loans from profligate and irresponsible lending have turned public banks into lenders of last resort.

This critical credit vacuum has been filled by private banks and NBFCs. Small businesses must get affordable cost of capital to generate earnings and for effective job creation. Without availability and affordability of funding, infrastructure projects will also be IRR negative. Simply put, without money as raw material, the GDP cannot chug along at 8% growth.

If credit growth is the oxygen of the economy, then debt borrowings are the legs that NBFCs stand on in lieu of CASA funding available to banks.

NBFCs therefore are critical to not just credit growth but to the growing Indian economy as a whole.

IL&FS as a systemically important NBFC

Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) is a complicated holding company structure controlled partly by the Government of India. As the name suggests – it was created to fund the booming infrastructure sector. Not so long ago, IL&FS AA rated bonds were hot property for debt and mutual funds that are amongst the biggest and strongest cartel of bond buyers in the illiquid Indian debt markets.

Infrastructure projects have long payback periods and often are financially unviable. As a result IL&FS began to default on its bond payments.

Investors choose debt funds precisely because they are perceived as lower risk when compared to equity based funds but a default on IL&FS interest payments would lead to massive redemptions and NAV losses. Debt and mutual funds would have proactively sold the bonds and there would be a freeze on buying further bonds in the illiquid Indian debt market.

Not being able to meet their funding needs, NBFCs would collapse. MSMEs would not get money, home lending would stop. Credit growth would fail.

The government has therefore bailed out IL&FS as a systemically important financial institution. It has changed the composition of the IL&FS board and offered funding through the Life Insurance Corporation.

Has the Risk Contagion been stopped?

Now coming to the key question for investors – has the timely government intervention stemmed the possibility of a wider risk contagion through the markets?

The 2008 risk contagion started in the debt markets, spreading through securitization structures (such as Collateralized Debt Obligations) and leading eventually to huge trading book losses for banks.

This crisis is different or was. It is a crisis of trust and not a crisis of complexity and interconnectedness. I illustrate this below –

US Markets in 2008:

Risk path = Sub-prime Debt -> Securitization -> Debt Instruments in Trading Book

Indian Markets in 2018:

Risk path = Doubtful Infrastructure Debt -> Debt fund buyers -> Funding and liabilities for NBFCs

As you can see, fortunately, complex securitization structures are absent from the Indian debt markets. Additionally, Indian banks do not have large volumes of trading book exposures to debt products.

In other words, the 2018 Indian risk map is linear. A risk contagion event would start with credit defaults and would play out as shown below –

Credit risk -> Counterparty risk -> Market risk -> Liquidity risk

For the most part, debt markets in India serve simple functions of providing liability funding to the issuer and low-risk interest payments to the borrower. For banks it serves treasury functions rather than trading functions.

By funding IL&FS the government mitigates credit risk and by backing IL&FS through its timely intervention, the government infuses key element of TRUST to stabilize counterparty risk

Market Risk is mostly caused by noise rather than fundamentals and will stabilize as soon as a steadiness in expected cash flows are perceived.

Conclusion

If I had to put my money on the probability of a localized financial crisis – I would wager a grand total of 100 rupees, just to be a good sport, because I do not believe anything akin to 2008 Lehman Crisis in scale or spread will occur in the foreseeable future.

The optimist in me believes that the Indian debt markets will recover soon and it will be business as usual for NBFCs. In a few years, it is possible that 2018 would be seen as a great buying opportunity for NBFCs, similar to what was seen during December 2016 after the demonetization of currency notes.

NIFTY broke 10k; but stay calm.

Understandably, these are difficult times. The NIFTY dropped under its 200 day moving average, a key trend indicator that institutions watch and which could trigger redemptions.

On Friday’s close the NIFTY settled just two points under the psychological barrier of 10k.

Redemptions by institutions – when they come – will drag the NIFTY further, followed by a freeze in domestic SIPs. This is where your worse case scenarios play out and urge you to be the first out the door before the roof comes crashing down.

My knowledge of technical analysis is basic and on TradingView you will see people calling out bearish patterns such as Heads and Shoulders and Rising Wedges.

Volatility is high and momentum indicators show the NIFTY is oversold. I know at least one Technical wizard who is buying based on this logic. But let’s remember that this (oversold with high volatility) was the same scenario in September 2008 and the worse might yet be to come.

What’s my position? I haven’t sold a single share in the past four weeks. Continue reading “NIFTY broke 10k; but stay calm.”

How the levy of Import Duties can help MSMEs in 2018 (The less obvious reasons)

In late 2017 after a long wait green shoots have appeared in stock market earnings, giving hope that current high market valuations may finally be sustainable. The bad news is that 2018 brings with it an expectation of an increase in crude and other commodity prices key for Indian Industry.

This is very bad timing for the economy, particularly small industry which is already reeling from demonetization and GST and is very sensitive to raw material prices.

Among finished goods listed above, the Government of India has also recently imposed duties on steel and cooking oil. I am not sure if these protectionist moves can be termed as a case of central planning overreach or a timely intervention but there are both obvious and less obvious reasons to why a levy of import duties now is critical to protecting small companies. Continue reading “How the levy of Import Duties can help MSMEs in 2018 (The less obvious reasons)”

Thoughts on using the Discounted Cash Flow for Small Caps

Interesting lecture by Professor Aswath Damodaran on intrinsic valuation, where he breaks down the use of the Discounted Cash Flow assumptions in some detail:

Interesting how the students approach DCF and seem to collectively conclude one of the Professor’s portfolio stocks (Twitter!) is overvalued by 1000%+.

It appears that in his investment decisions the Professor can take a contrarian position vis-a-vis his own field of study – where he is counted as among the best. A lesson for all the excel snobs amongst us. Stay humble.

Perhaps this is also because – as his lecture amply demonstrates – the DCF calculation has a lot of moving parts. When you have a lot of moving parts, the risk of error in each moving part gets multiplied to give you an overall risk of error with valuation using DCF.

So it helps to keep it simple while doing valuations. Here’s why I stick to a conventional, back of the envelope calculations like the Price Multiple Model to begin with. I wrote about how an investor can use the Price Multiple Model as a first step valuation, and combine it with other models.

Apart from the complexity, there are other problems with using the DCF for small caps:

  • The Small Cap Risk Premium is hard to determine and there is no sure way to know it exists!
  • Small Caps are subject to cyclical risks, which can lead to wrong factor assumptions in valuation
  • It is hard to predict steady returns with young companies
  • Cost of debt can be hard to calculate for Small Caps that are not investment grade or do not have a debt rating assigned to them

In valuing a Small Cap, it helps to understand intangibles first. It is a case-based approach that takes into account promoter quality, market size, competition, input prices, the balance sheet and scuttlebutt among many other factors.

In short – investing in small caps is a little like Venture Capital investing. Numbers are needed for comfort, before you take that leap across the void of permanent Capital Destruction.